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We present two simple, semiquantitative model-based decision tools, based on the 
principle of first 14 days incidence (FFI). The aim is to estimate the likelihood and the 
consequences, respectively, of the ultimate size of an ongoing FMD epidemic. The tools 
allow risk assessors to communicate timely, objectively, and efficiently to risk manag-
ers and less technically inclined stakeholders about the potential of introducing FMD 
suppressive emergency vaccination. To explore the FFI principle with complementary 
field data, we analyzed the FMD outbreaks in Argentina in 2001, with the 17 affected 
provinces as the units of observation. Two different vaccination strategies were applied 
during this extended epidemic. In a series of 5,000 Danish simulated FMD epidemics, 
the numbers of outbreak herds at day 14 and at the end of the epidemics were esti-
mated under different control strategies. To simplify and optimize the presentation of the 
resulting data for urgent decisions to be made by the risk managers, we estimated the 
sensitivity, specificity, as well as the negative and positive predictive values, using a cho-
sen day-14 outbreak number as predictor of the magnitude of the number of remaining 
post-day-14 outbreaks under a continued basic control strategy. Furthermore, during 
an ongoing outbreak, the actual cumulative number of detected infected herds at day 
14 will be known exactly. Among the number of epidemics lasting >14 days out of the 
5,000 simulations under the basic control scenario, we selected those with an assumed 
accumulated number of detected outbreaks at day 14. The distribution of the estimated 
number of detected outbreaks at the end of the simulated epidemics minus the number 
at day 14 was estimated for the epidemics lasting more than 14 days. For comparison, 
the same was done for identical epidemics (i.e., seeded with the same primary outbreak 
herds) under a suppressive vaccination scenario. The results indicate that, during the 
course of an FMD epidemic, simulated likelihood predictions of the remaining epidemic 
size and of potential benefits of alternative control strategies can be presented to risk 
managers and other stakeholders in objective and easily communicable ways.
Keywords: epidemics, modeling, disease control, risk communication, Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Table 1 | Detected number of outbreaks at day 14 (θi), provincial herd 
densities (ωi), and detected and predicted number of outbreaks after day 
14 for each affected province.
Province number of 
outbreaks 
until day 14
(ωi) number of outbreaks after day 14
Detected Predicted
θi
Ci model i Ci model ii
Buenos Aires 21 0.2 1,477 1,189 1,049
Catamarcaa 1 – 0 – –
Chaco 1 0.11 6 22 16
Cordoba 3 0.36 73 33 68
Corrientes 3 0.08 75 33 21
Entre Rios 4 0.4 159 40 98
Formosa 1 0.11 4 22 16
Jujuy 1 0.03 3 22 11
La Pampa 6 0.07 142 60 35
Mendozaa 1 – 0 – –
Misiones 1 0.3 10 22 36
Rio Negroa 2 – 0 – –
Salta 1 0.04 3 22 12
San Luis 9 0.09 17 108 67
Santa Fe 17 0.2 166 535 491
Santiago del 
Estero
2 0.06 30 27 16
Tucuman 3 0.12 2 33 24
aNot included in subsequent analyses due to 0 outbreaks after day 14.
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inTrODUcTiOn
A series of 10 criteria supporting a decision of whether or not 
to make use of protective emergency FMD-vaccination is listed 
in Annex X of Council Directive 2003/85/EC (1). These criteria 
include: “a rapidly rising incidence slope of outbreaks.” A simple, 
quantitative tool was proposed and documented by Hutber et al. 
(2), using the “first 14 days incidence” (FFI) of outbreaks in fore-
casting the duration and the cumulative number of outbreaks at 
the end using data from 12 regional foci of the UK 2001 FMD 
epidemic. Thus, according to the abovementioned directive, the 
FFI might be considered a useful parameter in deciding about the 
launching of emergency vaccinations in an attempt to lower the 
total number of outbreaks, as well as to shorten the duration and 
to lower the losses and costs of an ongoing epidemic.
Modeling the effects of available risk management options during 
an FMD outbreak in Denmark was undertaken in a recent research 
project (3). Results and comparisons of simulations of the basic control 
strategy were compared to different versions of depopulation and vac-
cination strategies, in terms of their influence on epidemic duration, 
size, losses, and costs. Simulation results to evaluate the FFI principle 
were presented by Halasa et al. (4) who introduced the alternative term 
“first 14 days outbreaks” (FFO).
Decision tools should not only provide scientifically valid results 
but also have to be transparent and communicable to non-scientists, 
such as politicians, the media, and the general public to appear trust-
worthy. Therefore, the technically complex simulation-based results 
(4) were reformulated as presented here to better allow for commu-
nication of the results to the non-scientifically inclined stakeholders. 
Preliminary results of this work have been presented elsewhere (5–7).
The objectives of this study are as follows:
•	 To further explore and evaluate the FFI/FFO principle (2), 
using field data from the FMD outbreaks in Argentina in 2001, 
with the 17 affected provinces as the units of observation, 
comprising more than 2,000 outbreaks throughout the coun-
try (8). Initially, in-contact herds were vaccinated and imposed 
with movement control. However, the extensive epidemic was 
finally controlled by mass vaccination, animal movement 
control, and active surveillance strategies (9).
•	 To describe two semiquantitative decision tools based on the 
FFI/FFO principle as applied to simulated quantitative FMD 
outbreak data from Denmark (4). These tools are meant for 
use by risk assessors to document and communicate critical 
information in a simplified format to risk managers, decision 
makers, and other stakeholders on the potential benefits and 
consequences of adding emergency FMD vaccination to the 
basic control strategy during an emerging FMD epidemic. 
The tools could also be used as assets to the development and 
exercise of national FMD contingency plans.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
argentina
Data from the 2001 FMD outbreaks in the 17 affected provinces 
were obtained from SENASA, as described previously (8). The 
number of outbreaks with complete data required for the analy-
ses (2,244 outbreaks or approx. 95% of all recorded outbreaks) 
are shown in Table 1, where the outbreaks are grouped by time 
of detection relative to day 14 of the epidemic, as proposed (2). 
Figure 1 shows a plot of the 14 provincial observations of the 
relationship between the numbers of accumulated detected 
outbreaks after day 14 against the accumulated number of 
outbreaks at day 14. A regression analysis was used to predict 
number of outbreaks at the end of the epidemic (Ci) using the 
accumulated number of outbreaks at day 14 as a direct predic-
tor (θi) (see Table 1), model I WinBugs version 1.4.3 (10) was 
used to quantify this relationship through a Bayesian mixed 
log-linear model, where Ci was assumed to follow a Poisson (λi) 
process, in which λ is the distribution of the total number of 
cases in each affected province in 2001. Therefore, the model is 
formally expressed as: Ci ~ Poisson (λi), log(λi) = β0 + β1θi + Ui 
where β0 denotes the model intercept, β1 denotes the regres-
sion coefficients for θi, and Ui denotes non-structured random 
effect. Ui is included in the formula to account for lack of 
independence in the observations due to variables other than θi. 
Non-informative prior distributions of the form N~ (0, 0.001) 
and N [0, δ ~ gamma (0.05, 0.005)] were used to model prior 
knowledge on the value of the regression coefficients. The model 
was run using 20,000 iterations after burning out the first 1,000 
iterations.
Furthermore, provincial herd densities (ωi) were included in 
a second model with θi (Table 1, model II), since herd density 
has been shown to be an important determinant for within-
province clustering of FMD herds (8). Confounding of ωi was 
evaluated using the method of change in the estimates of βi, and 
best fitting model was assessed based on the smallest value of the 
FigUre 1 | Plot of number of day 14 outbreaks against number of 
post-day-14 outbreaks for the argentina 2001 FMD epidemic from the 
14 provinces in the analysis. The top-right observation is the Buenos Aires 
province. Four provinces with small numbers of outbreaks are hidden, as 
they coincide with other close provincial outbreak numbers (see Table 1).
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deviance information criteria (DIC). Finally, a Kruskal–Wallis 
test was used to assess the significance of the differences between 
observed and predicted number of outbreaks at the end of the 
epidemic.
Denmark
Danish data were obtained from a series of FMD simulations 
from models with actual Danish population data on swine, cattle, 
and sheep herds at the national level and using FFO to designate 
the cumulative number of outbreaks detected in the first 14-days 
as a predictor for the size, duration, and costs of the epidemics. 
The simulation model, the farm data (simulated population), and 
the simulation study are explained in the next sections.
The Simulation Model
The DTU-DADS model (version 0.15) (11) was further updated 
(to version 0.16) and used to obtain the simulation data for the 
analysis in this study. The updates included updating the mod-
eling of the local spread and adjusting the code to correct a coding 
error. For the local spread, in the earlier version of the model, 
the probability of infection varied depending on distance from 
the infectious herds in a maximum of 3 km zone (3, 11). In the 
current version, the disease could spread locally depending on 
distance from the infectious herd in the same way as modeled 
earlier, but depending on time from the start of the infectiousness 
of the infectious herd using similar probabilities (12).
The Farm Data
The data consisted of all cattle, swine, sheep, and goat herds that 
are registered in the Central Herd Register (CHR) of Denmark in 
the period from first October 2006 until 30th September 2007. 
During this period, there were 23,550, 11,473, and 15,830 cattle, 
swine, and sheep/goat herds, respectively. The data included infor-
mation about the identification number, the UTM coordinates, 
the number of animals, and the rate of animal movements per 
day for each herd. While cattle herds were divided into milking 
and non-milking herds, sheep and goats were grouped into one 
category, while swine herds were split into 19 types (13). When 
a farm included several animal species, each species was given 
a different ID and set as a different herd on the same location 
and with the same CHR number. Further details about the study 
population and model input parameters can be found elsewhere 
(3, 11).
The Simulation Study
Modeling Virus Spread
Spread of infection between herds was simulated through seven 
spread mechanisms: (1) direct animal movement between herds; 
(2) abattoir trucks; (3) milk tankers; (4) veterinarians, artificial 
inseminators, and/or a milk controllers (medium risk contact); 
(5) visitors, feedstuff, and/or rendering trucks (low risk contact); 
(6) markets; and (7) local spread (11, 14).
The virus spread via animal movements and abattoir contacts 
was simulated based on the rate of movements/contacts per day 
calculated from actual movement data. For abattoir contacts, 
an additional parameter representing the number of herds that 
will be contacted by the abattoir truck on its way to the abattoir 
following its contact to the infectious herd was included based on 
the type of the infectious herd. Virus spread via medium and low 
risk contacts was simulated using the daily frequency of contact 
between herds via these routes. Virus spread via milk tank was 
possible only from a milking to another milking herd using the 
daily frequency of milk pickup from the dairy herds. Virus spread 
via markets was possible initially between cattle herds as markets 
in Denmark are restricted to cattle only. From markets, the virus 
could spread to susceptible herds due to movement of animals, 
people, and/or vehicles (11).
Modeling Disease Detection
An infected herd could be detected in one of the three mecha-
nisms, namely: first detection, basic detection, and detection 
following surveillance or tracing. First detection reflected the 
detection of the disease in the country (the index case/outbreak). 
This occurred following a specific number of days after the intro-
duction of infection. A PERT distribution was used to determine 
the day of first detection following virus introduction. The 
minimum, mode, and maximum values were 18, 21, and 23 days, 
respectively. Basic detection reflected the farmers’ awareness of 
a problem within their herds and hence calling the veterinarian, 
while detection through surveillance or tracing occurred follow-
ing a visit by the veterinary authorities. The probabilities of detec-
tion using the last two detection mechanisms were dependent on 
the type of the herd (11).
Modeling Disease Control
Once the first infected herd is detected, a set of control actions 
are enforced as explained earlier (11). These actions include (1) 
depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of all detected herds, 
(2) the implementation of a 3-km protection zone and a 15-km 
surveillance zone around each detected herd, (3) all susceptible 
herds within the zones are surveyed and animal movements 
and contacts between herds are restricted within the zones, 
(4) forward and backward tracing of animal movements and 
Table 2 | regression model parameters estimated from the argentina 
2001 epidemic data.
regression 
coefficients
Posterior 
estimates
sD Monte 
carlo 
error
97.5% cia Deviance 
information 
criteria
Model i
β0 2.89 0.061 <0.001 (2.77, 3.00) 1,199.61
β1θi 0.20 0.003 <0.001 (0.19, 0.21)
Model ii
β0 2.11 0.333 <0.001 (1.92, 2.30) 934.61
β1θi 0.19 0.003 <0.001 (0.19, 0.21)
β2ωi 4.28 0.096 <0.001 (3.63, 4.93)
a97.5% credible interval.
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contacts to and from detected herds, and (5) the implementa-
tion of a 3-day national stand still on animal movements. In 
addition, herds that received animals from detected herds were 
depopulated (11).
Extra control strategies, including preemptive depopulation 
or suppressive vaccination, were adopted in separate scenarios. 
When implemented, herds with susceptible animals within a 
1-km radius around newly detected herds were subjected to the 
extra control. The extra control strategy was initiated 14 days after 
first detection.
Initiation of Simulation and Model Run
The simulation started with the model loading the input data 
and, thereafter, selecting the primary outbreak herd, which 
is the first infected herd in the epidemic. About 5,000 cattle 
herds were selected randomly as potential primary outbreak 
herds to initiate disease spread. Earlier results have shown 
that epidemics initiated in cattle herds would provide larger 
spread than epidemics initiated in other species (14), reflecting 
a worse-case scenario. Each primary outbreak herd initiated 
an epidemic once, resulting in outbreak data from 5,000 
epidemics.
The outcomes of the model included epidemic duration 
(number of days between first detection and the culling of the last 
detected herd), number of infected herds, number of depopulated 
or vaccinated herds, and the total costs of the epidemics. The total 
costs were calculated as direct cost and export losses (11).
The Decision Tools
To simplify the presentation of pros and cons of vaccination to all 
stakeholders and to enable the urgent decisions to be made by the 
risk managers during the course of an ongoing FMD epidemic, a 
two-step methodology based on the FFO principle was applied in 
presenting the Danish simulation outcomes.
Quantifying Uncertainty (Predictive Values) of Estimating the 
Likelihood of a “Catastrophic” Epidemic
During an ongoing national FMD epidemic, the actual cumula-
tive number of outbreaks at day 14 will have a given observed 
value, e.g., 15 herds (i.e., FFO =  15). Data from the simulated 
epidemics lasting more than 14 days were distributed among the 
cells of a two-by-two table based on a selected cutoff value for both 
the independent (i.e., FFO = 15) and of the dependent variables 
(a chosen “catastrophic” number of post-day-14 outbreaks, e.g., 
50 or 100). This enables estimation of sensitivity, specificity, and 
negative and positive predictive values describing the association 
between the observed FFO value and a “catastrophic” epidemic 
in terms of the cumulative number of outbreaks occurring after 
day 14.
The estimation procedure described above was performed 
using simulated data for the basic control strategy throughout 
5,000 simulated epidemics in Denmark.
If applied as part of an exercise to update FMD contingency 
plans, a series of alternative FFO and “catastrophic” simulated 
outbreak numbers post-day-14 might be explored for the com-
parative control strategies.
Quantifying the Consequences (Expected Benefits) in Terms 
of the Number of Prevented “Catastrophic” Outbreaks when 
Changing to a Vaccination Strategy at Day 14 during the 
Epidemic
The frequency distribution of the observed number of total 
cumulative outbreaks for the series of simulated epidemics 
with the observed fixed FFO-value were compared for the basic 
control strategy and the vaccination strategy, with both strate-
gies applied to the same set of simulated epidemics in terms of 
the seeded primary outbreak herds. The benefit of changing 
from basic control to emergency vaccination can be estimated 
by comparing the number and proportion of “catastrophic” 
epidemics expected in the basic with those in the vaccination 
simulations.
resUlTs
The argentinian epidemic
Table 2 summarizes the posterior estimates for the two regression 
models. While θi is a significant predictor for Ci by itself, ωi is an 
important confounder based on the method of the change in the 
posterior estimate (i.e., the constant’s coefficient changed by 27%), 
a significant predictor (97.5% CI), and substantially improved the 
fit of the model (smallest DIC value).
The observed and predicted number of outbreaks for models I 
and II are summarized in Table 2. No significant differences were 
identified between the number of observed and the number of 
predicted outbreaks at the end of the epidemic for models I and 
II (Kruskal–Wallis p-value >0.54).
Descriptive results of the Danish 
simulations
Table 3 shows the overall descriptive results from the simulation 
study, using the basic control, preemptive depopulation, and 
suppressive vaccination scenarios. For instance, using the median 
basic scenario, epidemic duration is predicted to be 36 days (5th 
and 95th percentiles 2–128 days), resulting in 22 infected herds 
(5th and 95th percentiles 2–145 herds), and a total loss of €869 
million (5th and 95th percentiles €703–€1,434 million).
Among the group of 5,000 simulations specifically considered 
here, 4,092 epidemics lasted >14 days. Figure 2 shows a plot of 
these simulated epidemics with their accumulated number of 
FigUre 2 | Plot of the number of day 14 outbreaks against the 
number of post-day 14 outbreaks for the 4,092 simulated Danish FMD 
epidemics lasting more than 14 days.
Table 4 | Danish-simulated FMD epidemics lasting more than 14 days: 
specificity, sensitivity, negative predictive value (nPV), and positive 
predictive value (PPV) for two alternative combinations (a and b) of 
the presumed observed cumulative outbreak size on day 14, and the 
subsequent cumulative outbreak size until the end of the epidemic.
a: more or less than 50 outbreaks expected subsequently
Outbreaks on 
day 14
Outbreaks after day 14
<50 ≥50 Total
<15 2,009 156 2,165 NPV = 93%
≥15 1,284 643 1,927 PPV = 33%
Total 3,293 799 4,092 p(≥50) = 20%
Sp = 61% Se = 80%
b: more or less than 100 outbreaks expected subsequently
Outbreaks on day 14 Outbreaks after day 14
<100 ≥100 Total
<15 2,092 73 2,165 NPV = 97%
≥15 1,719 208 1,927 PPV = 11%
Total 3,811 281 4,092 p(≥100) = 7%
Sp = 55% Se = 74%
Table 3 | summary of the results of 5,000 simulated Danish FMD epidemics all starting in cattle herds; median and 5–95% ci.
control strategy epidemic duration infected herds culled herds Vaccinated herds Total costs (€ million)
Basic control throughout 36 (2–128) 22 (2–145) 22 (2–145) 0 869 (703–1,434)
Preemptive depopulationa 25 (2–50) 19 (2–67) 35 (2–150) 0 807 (703–994)
Suppressive vaccinationa 36 (2–98) 22 (2–105) 22 (2–105) 24 (0–184) 863 (703–1,284)
aChange from basic control after day 14.
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outbreaks occurring after day 14 until the end of the epidemics, 
against the accumulated number of outbreaks at day 14.
Quantifying Predictive Values based on 
the FFO Principle
For a set of chosen cutoff values [i.e., FFO <  15 vs. FFO ≥  15 
outbreaks and <50 vs. ≥50 outbreaks recorded after day 14 
(Table 4)], the negative predictive value (NPV) is 93% and the 
positive predictive value (PPV) is 33%. This would mean a 7% 
probability of an epidemic with <15 outbreaks at day 14 becom-
ing a “catastrophic epidemic” of ≥50 subsequent outbreaks, if the 
basic strategy was continued, while there would be a 33% prob-
ability that an epidemic with ≥15 outbreaks at day14 would turn 
out to be a” catastrophic epidemic” of ≥50 subsequent outbreaks 
with no change in strategy.
Changing the cutoff value for “catastrophic” epidemics to ≥100 
outbreaks changes the NPV to 97% (Table 4). This means that 
if <15 infected herds have been detected up until day 14, there 
would be an estimated probability of just 3% that the ongoing 
epidemic under a continued basic control strategy would result in 
a cumulative number of outbreaks of ≥100. The PPV, however, is 
estimated at only 11%, which is explainable by the relatively low 
probability of “catastrophic” epidemics of ≥100 outbreaks among 
the simulated outcomes (p = 7%).
Quantifying the expected benefit of 
changing to a Vaccination strategy during 
an epidemic
Among the simulated epidemics lasting 14 days or more, all the 
simulations with a cumulative number of outbreaks equal to 15 
were chosen (i.e., assuming that in an ongoing field epidemic, 
FFO = 15), resulting in 182 epidemics, which were further ana-
lyzed. The distribution of the number of outbreaks at the end of the 
epidemics minus the FFO-value of 15 was determined (Figure 3). 
The distribution of the number of outbreaks under the basic con-
trol scenario is compared to that under a suppressive vaccination 
scenario for the same 182 epidemics, i.e., using the same primary 
outbreak herds as in the basic control scenario (Figure  4). Of 
the eight “catastrophic epidemics” with ≥100 outbreaks after day 
14 in the basic scenario, 5 (63%) were predicted to be spared by 
applying emergency vaccination. Using 50 outbreaks as the cutoff, 
13 out of the 29 (i.e., 45%) of these “catastrophic epidemics” were 
predicted to be spared by vaccination, see Figures 3 and 4.
DiscUssiOn
For the Argentina 2001 epidemic, the median herd disease repro-
duction ratio decreased significantly from 2.4 (before the epidemic 
was officially recognized) to 1.2 during the mass-vaccination 
campaign and <1 following the mass-vaccination campaign (9). 
This is consistent with our finding of the agreement with the FFO 
principle for this epidemic, although once the index outbreak was 
detected, control activities were applied including both emer-
gency vaccination of in-contact-herds, and subsequently mass 
vaccination, which started late and lasted for a long period due 
the extended area and large numbers of herds to be covered (8, 9). 
FigUre 4 | Distribution under the emergency vaccination scenario of 
the 182 epidemics with 15 detected herds at day 14 by number of 
post-day 14 outbreaks. The two alternative definitions of “catastrophic” 
epidemics in terms of number of outbreaks are indicated.
FigUre 3 | Distribution under the basic control scenario of 182 
FMD-epidemics with 15 detected herds at day 14 by number of 
post-day 14 outbreaks. The two alternative definitions of “catastrophic” 
epidemics in terms of number of outbreaks are indicated.
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One would generally expect a marked decrease in the number 
of outbreaks following vaccination, but in this case, the initial 
intervention probably was of insufficient magnitude to effectively 
control the spread, resulting in a substantial epidemic tail-end in 
terms of number of outbreaks, duration, and geographical cover-
age. Had it been possible to monitor the early part of the epidemic 
and to apply the FFI/FFO tools described here, i.e., to act on day 
14 of the epidemic, it might have led to a smaller epidemic and 
a faster recovery. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the 
association between the accumulated number of outbreaks at day 
14 and the subsequent number of cases in each affected province, 
as indicated by the value of the regression coefficient (Table 2), 
is influenced by the presence of the large outbreak contributions 
from the Buenos Aires province (see Figure  1). However, the 
nature of the association, as indicated by the positive sign of the 
regression coefficient and its significance (see 97.5% CI, Table 2) 
remains (data not shown). For that reason, we conclude that the 
model was robust to the inclusion or exclusion of Buenos Aires 
in the analysis. Inclusion is justified, however, by the biological 
and economical significance of the 67% of the total number of 
outbreaks, which this province accounted for.
A high degree of variation is seen in the Danish simulation 
results (Figure 2). This is likely due to the Danish data describing 
5,000 different simulated epidemics, while both the British (2) 
and the Argentinean data considered here were concerned with 
regional variations within individual extended field epidemics. 
Our main finding as shown in Figures 3 and 4, favoring vaccination 
over continued basic control when aiming to avoid catastrophic 
epidemics, is consistent with the overall results of the Danish 
simulation study (4). As can be seen from Table 3, on average, 
the alternative control strategies do not differ much; however, the 
extreme upper range values tend to be lower for the vaccination 
and cull strategies than for the basic control strategy. The relatively 
low positive predictive values (Tables 4) of course influence the 
average benefit/cost ratio of implementing a vaccination strategy 
based on this procedure, as many such vaccination campaigns 
apparently may be wasted, since by far most epidemics would 
entail <50 outbreaks with just the basic control strategy. This 
might indicate that the basic control strategy could be continued 
with a reasonably high degree of confidence. So here, also the PPV 
indicates a limited effect to be expected from a change of strategy 
toward vaccination. Apparently, a cutoff value of 100 predicted 
outbreaks to be used for vaccination considerations may be too 
high to yield useful decision criteria, because only a small percent-
age (here 7%) of simulated outbreaks reach that level under the 
basic control strategy. Such information would be valuable to note, 
when using simulations as part of FMD contingency planning and 
exercising. The benefits of possibly reducing the actual number 
of outbreaks within “non-catastrophic” epidemics due to vaccina-
tion are, however, not taken into account in these estimates.
The added economic costs introduced by applying FMD vac-
cination should be considered when setting the cutoff for what 
would be a “catastrophic epidemic” in terms of the number of 
outbreaks. Implementing vaccination in a control strategy by itself 
might be very costly, e.g., due to a lengthier trade ban for Danish 
animals and products on the export markets (3). Thus, risk man-
agers might tolerate up to a moderate likelihood of a high number 
of outbreaks in order to avoid these economic consequences of 
vaccination. However, if the decision tool predicts vaccination to 
spare a relative large number of outbreaks, the added costs may 
appear acceptable, also considering the welfare benefits of a limited 
culling after implementation of suppressive vaccination strategy.
Along with the aspects of risk assessment and risk man-
agement discussed above, risk communication is an equally 
important part of an FMD risk analysis in the face of an ongoing 
epidemic (15). The interactions of these three components are 
nowhere more critical than in the initial phases of a national FMD 
epidemic, when alternative control strategies must be considered. 
Fast and reliable assessment of the likelihood and consequences 
of spread and the continuous evaluation and selection of opti-
mal management and control measures should be supported 
by timely, robust, and transparent communication among risk 
assessors, risk managers, and other stakeholders. Only then may 
urgent and critically important decisions be properly understood 
and accepted. Emergency vaccination should be considered, if 
the anticipated cumulative size of the epidemic under a contin-
ued basic control strategy appears alarming and if a sufficient 
reduction can be expected in the magnitude and duration of the 
7Willeberg et al. Semiquantitative Decision Tools for FMD Vaccination
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epidemic to justify the estimated additional direct and indirect 
control costs incurred by vaccination (3).
Several FMD epidemics affected Europe and South America 
in 2001 and the control strategies applied have been discussed 
extensively (8, 9), major obstacles to effective prevention, detec-
tion, and control of FMD have been identified and the role of 
disease models in animal health emergency preparedness has 
been highlighted (16–18). In particular, the following statements 
characterize the situation facing authorities when it comes to 
decisions on the potential use of emergency vaccination during 
an FMD epidemic:
 - The decisions about if and how to vaccinate during a major 
FMD epidemic are complex (9).
 - The choice of whether or not to apply emergency vaccination 
is probably the most difficult decision facing the authorities 
when disease breaks out in an erstwhile FMD-free country. 
Effective computational models should be actively financed 
for a range of outbreak scenarios to assist objective decision-
making and minimize bureaucratic delays in vaccine applica-
tion (19).
 - There is a need for better analytical tools to support decisions 
for FMD control (20).
When future epidemics occur, scientific and political debate 
will rise again regarding the merits of vaccination, with many 
technical, logistical, economic, political, cultural, and historical 
facts affecting the decision. Generally, vaccination decisions have 
to be made quickly and will be influenced greatly by previous 
experiences, but because large FMD epidemics are extremely rare 
events, the opportunities to directly assess the effects of control 
strategies are very limited (9). Therefore, effective computational 
models should be made available for a range of outbreak scenarios 
to assist objective decision-making and minimize bureaucratic 
delays in vaccine application, and continued efforts are required 
to develop robust models for use during outbreaks in FMD-free 
countries (19, 21). Comparison of the pros and cons of alterna-
tive control strategies has been the aim of numerous simulation 
modeling studies, as recently reviewed and discussed (21, 22). 
The special importance of communicating output results from 
modeling tools to decision makers has been highlighted by 
the European Commission for the control of Foot-and-Mouth 
Disease—EuFMD (23):
 - Member states should consider the use of modeling tools 
as decision-making aids, while ensuring that the output of 
such models are clearly understood by decision makers with 
respect to uncertainty and sensitivity.
The results presented here indicate that, in the context of a 
decision-making aid, choice of control strategy and predictions of 
epidemic consequences based on the cumulative number of out-
breaks detected by day 14 would be useful. Furthermore, results 
from simulation models comparing alternative control strategies 
can be documented and communicated to risk managers and 
stakeholders in simple ways, which seem appropriate in urgently 
informing decisions about whether or not to implement changes, 
such as deployment of emergency vaccination.
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